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Cybermarks
Dan L. Burk†
INTRODUCTION
Trademark disputes have been a fixture of Internet law
since the first days of commercial traffic on the network. These
disputes have persisted across a variety of technological and legal changes, and as previous commentators have correctly
noted, have significantly distorted the policy and doctrine of
trademark law in general. In the next few pages I propose to
examine why Internet trademarks, which I have called “cybermarks,” are so persistent, why cybermarks are different, and
how recognition of that difference might lead us to approach
disputes over their use more productively.
I use the portmanteau term “cybermark” advisedly, well
aware of the popular tendency to indiscriminately attach the
cyber-prefix to any item associated with the Internet or information technology, to produce catchy but largely meaningless
buzzwords.1 But the prefix hails originally from the discipline
of cybernetics,2 denoting the governance or regulation of systems, particularly the control of information systems,3 and ultimately from a Greek root indicating steering or control.4 And
that is precisely the right term for the marks I propose to examine. It is not so much the correct term because of their use
† Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California at Irvine. Copyright © 2010 by Dan L. Burk.
1. Indeed, the science fiction author William Gibson, who first coined the
term “cyberspace” for his dystopian stories of the future, has commented that
he used it as a catchy buzzword, not because it had any particular semantic
content. NO MAPS FOR THESE TERRITORIES: A DOCUMENTARY BY MARK NEALE
(Docurama 2000).
2. See NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS OR CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION IN THE ANIMAL AND THE MACHINE 19 (1948).
3. Gordon Pask, Cybernetics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 936, 936–37
(1972).
4. See WIENER, supra note 2, at 19.
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on the Internet, figuratively in “cyberspace.” Rather, cybermarks are components of a data processing system, intended to
initiate and control discrete functions of a machine. Unlike
trademarks in traditional media, cybermarks are marks that
“behave.”5 Although they may in other contexts serve the
source-identifying function of trademarks, cybermarks are no
longer primarily expressive; they are functional in the most
mechanical sense of the term; they have become a form of computer code.
In discussing the character of cybermarks, I draw on parallel disputes regarding functional subject matter in patent and
copyright law. I begin by briefly tracing the history of Internet
trademark disputes over the past fifteen years. I then discuss
the functional nature of cybermarks and their relationship to
other functional subject matter in intellectual property. I suggest that trademark law’s functionality doctrine is appropriately suited to resolving cybermark disputes, and conclude by addressing some possible objections to using functionality
doctrine to resolve cybermark disputes.
I. TRADEMARKS ON THE INFOBAHN
Internet trademark disputes appeared almost immediately
after public access to the network became available, in the mid1990s, even before other intellectual property disputes appeared.6 Trademark disputes have been a consistent feature of
the Internet’s legal landscape since then, appearing in connection with a range of successive technologies including domain
names, search engines, and keyword advertising.7 Although
these technologies appear to involve very different factual settings, they share certain common features that have animated
trademark disputes. Tracing the trajectory of trademark issues
in these different settings sets the stage for understanding the
nature of cybermarks.
A. DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
The earliest Internet trademark disputes were centered
around domain names, the mnemonic labels that assist in iden-

5. See Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2320 (1994).
6. See Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 695, 696 (1998).
7. See infra Parts II.A–C.

2010]

CYBERMARKS

1377

tifying the locations of resources on the Internet.8 Some of
these mnemonic labels are cognates to well-known word marks;
in many cases, so-called cybersquatters were able to register
and use such cognate domain names before the holder of the
trademark was able to do so.9 In some cases, this led to extortionate demands for payment in exchange for surrender of the
domain name registration to the trademark holder.10 In other
cases, the domain name holder had as logical a claim to the
domain name as the trademark holder.11
In early commentary on the problem of domain names, I
suggested that such identifiers were frequently filling the role
of addresses rather than the role of names.12 Names are identifiers attached to discrete objects; addresses identify physical
or logical locations where objects can be found.13 Trademarks
must be the former; trademarks are names and not addresses;
they identify a good or service, not the location of a good or service.14 It is certainly not unknown for a physical or logical address to gain the status of a trademark by acquiring secondary
meaning, but only when the address becomes a name, rather
than serving as a locator. Given that both domain names and
Internet protocol (IP) addresses are by definition locators rather than denominators,15 domain names could only be protected as trademarks to the extent that they function as names
rather than as addresses.
This point was largely lost in the succeeding scramble over
control of prominent or readily recognized domain names.16 A
generation of “cybersquatters” acquired recognizable domain
names on a first-come, first-served basis, then sought to resell

8. See Dawn C. Nunziato, Freedom of Expression, Democratic Norms,
and Internet Governance, 52 EMORY L.J. 187, 193 (2003).
9. See, e.g., id. at 204 –05.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 206.
12. Dan L. Burk, Trademarks Along the Infobahn: A First Look at the
Emerging Law of Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 12 (1995), http://jolt
.richmond.edu/v1i1/burk.html.
13. See id.
14. See id. ¶ 23.
15. See id. ¶ 12.
16. Although, the point was not entirely lost on a few courts. See, e.g.,
Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 878 (6th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing the identifying function of domain names from trademark usage); Lockheed Martin Corp.
v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956–58 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d,
194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) (same).
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those names to the owners of cognate trademarks.17 Trademark
owners responded with infringement suits,18 the domain name
governance authority instituted its own alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) process,19 the Internet domain name governance system came under fire and was reorganized,20 and the
U.S. Congress weighed in with a federal statute that was likely
premature and was certainly poorly conceived.21 Debates raged
over the governance of domain names and IP addresses, over
the expansion of name space by designation of new top level
domains, and over “reverse” domain name hijacking by which
trademark owners themselves used their newly minted legal
recourse to wrest cognate domain names away from legitimate
users.22
After numerous court opinions, registrar dispute decisions,
and interminable commentary, the problem of domain names
appears to have settled into a sort of uneasy equilibrium in
which issues and disputes over domain names remain, but have
become sufficiently familiar that they are now simply part of
the furniture in electronic commerce. While the resolutions to
domain name disputes remain imperfect and even problematic,
they no longer dominate the discussion over Internet trademarks, perhaps because newer technologies have taken the
spotlight. For example, even as the dispute over domain names

17. See Nunziato, supra note 8, at 204 –05.
18. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880 (9th
Cir. 1999); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1043 (9th Cir. 1999); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 286–87
(D.N.J. 1998), aff’d, 159 F.3d 1351 (3rd Cir. 1998); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen,
947 F. Supp. 1227, 1234 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945
F. Supp. 1296, 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1996), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
19. See A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy”: Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 608 (2002); Laurence
R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case
of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 141, 149 (2001); Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: A Statistical Assessment
of ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 17 INFO. SOC’Y 151, 152 (2001).
20. See Susan Crawford, The ICANN Experiment, 12 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 409, 415 (2004); A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN 2.0: Meet the New
Boss, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1087, 1088 (2003); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo,
Pondering the Politics of Private Procedures: The Case of ICANN, 4 I/S: J.L. &
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 345, 349 (2008).
21. See Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common
Law in Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 310–11 (2002).
22. See Froomkin, supra note 19, at 623, 629.
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was unfolding, trademark disputes emerged in regard to another Internet technology, that of search engines.23
B. AUTOMATED SEARCH
Like the domain name system (DNS), search engines were
intended to help classify and locate information on the Internet,24 but search engines are less reliant than the DNS on human memory as the mechanism to locate Internet resources.
Instead, search engines employ a combination of software functions to organize web page content.25 First, the search engine
typically employs a “bot”—short for robot26—or “spider” or
“crawler”—from the mixed metaphor of “crawling” the world
wide “web”—that will automatically retrieve content from servers on the Internet.27 The content is then analyzed and indexed
according to some database algorithm.28 Different search engines use different criteria for indexing, and different algorithms for determining the associations and rankings in their
databases: some use the number of links on a page, or the
number of links to a page, or the lexical content of the page, or
a combination of factors.29 But in any of these systems, the delivery and ranking of pages is connected to keywords that appear on those pages.
Finally, the search engine includes some user search function that will allow the indexed content to be retrieved via a
graphic interface when related keywords are entered as search
terms by a user. Search results are typically delivered as a list
of hypertext links that allow the user to retrieve the original
content from its originating server when clicked.30 Search results are displayed in some order of relevance determined by

23. For an overview of search engines and associated legal issues, see
James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1
(2007).
24. Id. at 6.
25. See JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH: HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE THE RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 20 (2005).
26. See Gove N. Allen et al., Academic Data Collection in Electronic Environments: Defining Acceptable Use of Internet Resources, 30 MGMT. INFO. SYS.
Q. 599, 603 (2006), available at http://gove.net/home/pdf/academicdatacollection
.pdf.
27. See PRESTON GRALLA, HOW THE INTERNET WORKS 187 (6th ed. 2002).
28. Id.
29. See id.; Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web: Why
the Politics of Search Engines Matters, 16 INFO. SOC’Y 169, 171–72 (2000).
30. See GRALLA, supra note 27, at 188–89.
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the algorithm of the search function.31 Many of the early disputes regarding search engines stemmed from the limitations
of such two-dimensional, sequential displays in communicating
the results of a search to the user. The advantages to website
operators of being noticed and prominently displayed among
the first results of a search engine query led to a proliferation
of methods for “search optimization”—that is, for increasing the
likelihood of a higher rank in the displayed results, and so
hopefully garnering more attention from those conducting
searches.32
Early web search engines relied heavily on the lexical content of pages for their indexing algorithms. One strategy for
manipulating algorithms that classified and ranked web pages
according to their content was to invisibly embed keywords in
the text of the page.33 This could be accomplished, for example,
by including the text of a keyword multiple times in the same
color as the background of the page, so that the text would be
imperceptible to human readers, but would still be detected by
software that looks at the page’s code, not the page’s visible color.
Alternatively, search engines relied on the “metatags” embedded in the HTML code of the web page.34 Such code is not
displayed in the normal course of viewing a web page, although
most web browsers can reveal the codes when a viewer desires
to see them.35 But most significantly, the codes are seen by the
software that is indexing the page. Web page designers found
that it was possible to manipulate or alter the indexing of web
pages by clever use of metatags, or by calculated construction of
a page’s lexical content.36 The use of metatags or keyword texts
on web pages was intended ultimately to attract consumer attention, but the method of accomplishing this was to influence
the delivery of search results to consumers by manipulating the
indexing functions of the search engine.
31. See Introna & Nissenbaum, supra note 29, at 174.
32. Id.
33. Id. The practice was sometimes known as “spamdexing,” a portmanteau of “indexing” and “spam.” See Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing Search Engines with Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 43, 46 (1998).
34. See generally JENNIFER NIEDERST, WEB DESIGN IN A NUTSHELL: A
DESKTOP QUICK REFERENCE 111–14 (2d ed. 2001) (defining metatags and describing their use).
35. See id.
36. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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Emblematic among the opinions considering this technology is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Welles.37 The plaintiff, a well-known adult entertainment company, objected to a website operated by Terri Welles, a former
Playboy magazine model who had been Playboy’s “Playmate of
the Year” for 1981.38 Playboy sued its former model for, inter
alia, use of the registered trademarks “Playboy” and “Playmate” in the site’s HTML metatags.39 The court held that the
use of the terms “playboy” and “playmate” in the metatags of
the website constituted a truthful “nominative” use of the
marks: Ms. Welles had in fact been selected by Playboy magazine as a playmate, and there was no other feasible terminology
to describe her status to consumers who might be searching for
her web pages.40 But not all of the Playboy references on the
web page were deemed nominative uses. Somewhat oddly, the
court held that the repetition of the acronym “PMOY ‘81,” for
“Playmate of the Year 1981” in the web page background was
not “necessary” to describe Ms. Welles, and so did not qualify as
nominative use,41 even though the function of the repeated
acronym was the same as that of the metatags: to optimize the
index and retrieval of the web page in search engines.
C. KEYWORD ADVERTISING
Although the technology of Internet search subsequently
shifted away from metatag indexing, trademark disputes remained at the forefront of cyberlaw. More recent cases have
wrestled with the use of trademarks as keywords associated
with advertising, for example in the context of “pop-up” windows connected to web browsers.42 Such pop-ups might be triggered by a software application that detects a keyword on a
website viewed by the consumer; the software then delivers an
advertisement associated with the keyword. Where the keyword is a trademark, the advertisement could well promote the
product or service of the mark owner’s competitor.43 This type
37. 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
38. Id. at 799.
39. Id. at 800.
40. Id. at 803.
41. Id. at 804.
42. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407–
08 (2d Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734,
736 (E.D. Mich. 2003); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d
723, 724 (E.D. Va. 2003).
43. See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 407–08.
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of technology was at issue, for example, in the Second Circuit’s
decision in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.44 The
Second Circuit held that the use of a competitor’s trademark to
trigger a pop-up advertisement was not a trademark “use” because the directory in which the triggering keyword was embedded was unseen by users, and inaccessible to the public.45
The most recent set of controversies over Internet trademarks come from the related practice of search engines displaying sponsored advertising along with search results, prompted
by the keywords used in the search. For example, in the Google
Adwords program, advertisers are allowed to select a variety of
keywords that will prompt the display of their paid ads.46 As in
the case of pop-up advertisements, some keywords might constitute trademarks, and trademark holders have objected to the
display of competitor’s ads triggered by their trademark.47 Although some courts have applied reasoning similar to that in
the 1-800 Contacts decision to sponsored advertising,48 more recent appellate opinions seem inclined to say that prompting
competing advertising with a trademark keyword constitutes a
form of infringement.49
II. CYBERMARKS AS CODE
Having sketched the broad outlines of the history of Internet trademark disputes to date, I hope to make it apparent that
there is a common thread to these cases, and it is not merely
that they happen to be styled as trademark claims. We begin by
considering the metatag cases. Although in some sense these
cases may seem irrelevant, since this technique is no longer
commonly used for search engine web indexing, the metatag
cases nonetheless provide an important insight into all the
trademark cases we have reviewed. This is because the metatag cases present the most extreme version of the puzzle that is
44. Id.
45. Id. at 409; accord Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 762–74; U-Haul
Int’l, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 725.
46. See BATTELLE, supra note 25, at 124 –26.
47. See, e.g., Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 274,
277 (D. Mass. 2009); Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 527 F.
Supp. 2d 205, 206 (D. Mass. 2007).
48. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 403
(N.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated, 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
49. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129–31 (2d Cir.
2009).
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common to the various Internet trademark situations. The metatag cases pose the puzzle in the starkest possible form.
A. MACHINE-READABLE MARKS
The puzzle of the metatag cases is this: the cases consider
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of using well-recognized trademarks as metatags. But the legal problem in trademark cases
is always the likelihood of confusion between the protected
mark and the accused infringing mark.50 Or, in trademark dilution cases, the problem is the potential to dilute or blur the distinctiveness of the protected mark in the minds of consumers.51
Yet metatags are not intended to be seen by humans, and absent an uncommon degree of technical skill would never be
seen by consumers.52 This is true whether we are considering
the HTML-coded metatags, which like other HTML codes are
not usually displayed by a web browser, or whether we are considering the use of trademarks as web page text hidden by color
camouflage in the background of the document. In each case
the “trademark” for which the use is contested is found in code
read by a machine—the indexing “spider” or “bot” of a web
search engine—and is hidden from the perception of lay Internet users.
So it is rather difficult to say that consumers are confused
or that their perceptions are diluted by metatags. The consumers who are necessarily part of the legal claim in a trademark
case would have had no opportunity to blur or confuse the metatags with anything; they would have seen only search results
that were influenced by the deployment of metatags. The objection in the cases was not that the consumers entered trademarks as keywords into the search engine; the mark owners
were presumably delighted that consumers were searching using their marks. The owners instead objected to the results that
were returned due to the unseen metatags. So where was the
consumer confusion? Certainly, the metatags created associations in the database of the search engine, but a search engine
is not a consumer. It could hardly be said that the machine is
likely to be confused by the metatag, or that the mark would be
less distinctive in the mind of the search engine due to the metatag. Inappropriate mechanical association regarding a mark
50. See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:1 (4th ed. 2007).
51. Id. § 24:67.
52. See supra text accompanying note 35.
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is not a trademark claim; only inappropriate consumer association regarding the mark is a trademark claim.
Metatag cases present the most extreme version of this
problem, but they are not unique. A similar situation is presented in the advertising pop-up cases, where the roster of
keywords that would trigger an advertisement was unseen by,
and inaccessible to, the browser user. Some of the pop-up cases
in fact explicitly recognized the lack of consumer awareness as
a factor in determining the case’s outcome.53 This logic has
been extended to keyword searching cases; several Second Circuit Court opinions, following the logic of the 1-800 Contacts
opinion, held that “internal” uses of a trademark within search
technology were not actionable as infringement.54 The more recent appellate opinion in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc.
amends this line of reasoning, holding that “internal” use of a
mark is not automatically sufficient to compel a finding that
the use as an advertising keyword is not trademark “use.”55 But
the court in that case had to go to some length to find a situs
for “consumer” confusion, finally—and dubiously—settling on
the selection of the trademark “adwords” by advertisers as the
moment of potential “confusion.”56
The fact that the “trademarks” in such cases were “read”
by machines, but not by consumers, is a key insight to the puzzle of Internet cybermarks. The conclusion in the Rescuecom
case, that “internal” use of a trademark is not itself dispositive
of the legal issues,57 is correct, although I would suggest that it
is perhaps not correct in quite the way that the court intended.
The question is not whether a string of characters, that when
visualized would constitute a trademark, is used “internally” or
“externally,” visibly or invisibly, in the operation of the search
technology. The question is whether the character string is being used as a mechanism in search technology. Analytically, the
use of the character string as a component of search is more
apparent in the cases where the search string functions “internally,” without display of the characters to consumers. The
53. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir.
2005); U-Haul Int’l, Inc., v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (E.D.
Va. 2003).
54. S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Austl. Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 199–202
(E.D.N.Y. 2007); Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F.
Supp. 2d 402, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
55. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2009).
56. Id. at 125–26, 130–31.
57. Id. at 129–30.
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search technology designs that involve “internal” use help bifurcate the search mechanism function from the consumer recognition function—and, as a corollary, consumer confusion
seems unlikely where the consumer cannot observe the character string.
Search terms or domain names entered into a field on a
screen display are less obviously search mechanisms, as they
are seen by people as well as by machines. But search mechanisms that are perceptible to the consumer are no less mechanisms. Consider by analogy a two-dimensional pattern such as
the universal price code (UPC) bar code or similar optical coding that identifies and tracks the product to which it is affixed.58 We can imagine that such codes might gain secondary
meaning, or perhaps even be inherently distinctive, since the
code patterns are arbitrary in relation to the products they label.59 Probably very few consumers pay close enough attention
to the details of bar codes to associate them with source, but in
principle there is no reason that this association could not occur. However, even if they were communicative of source, such
code labels are clearly functional, as they are a device in an automated identification and tracking system.60 They are as much
an operational component of the tracking and inventory system
as the laser scanner that reads them or the electronic media
that interprets them. The optical codes may be printed symbolic indicia, but they are equivalent to the physically configured
code of a mechanical device such as tumblers in a hardware
lock,61 or to the coded array of voltages across a data processing
device. Indeed, the information in the optical codes is translated into exactly such voltages in the context of the system to
which they belong.

58. See CHARLES PETZOLD, CODE: THE HIDDEN LANGUAGE OF COMPUTER
HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 79 (1999).
59. Cf., e.g., Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 211
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 909, 916–17 (T.T.A.B. 1981) (denying trademark registration
to distinctive optical scanning patterns). Interestingly, the Second Circuit has
held in an opinion by Judge Leval, author of the Rescuecom opinion, that removal of UPC codes from product packaging may be a form of trademark infringement because it impairs the mark holder’s ability to control product
quality. Zino Davidoff SA v. CVS Corp., 571 F.3d 238, 242–44 (2d Cir. 2009).
60. See PETZOLD, supra note 58, at 80–83.
61. Cf. NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 29 (1978) (Hersey, Comm’r, dissenting)
(noting that software is equivalent to a mechanical device).
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The same is true of keywords, metatags, or domain names.
The entry of alphabetic symbols into a search engine by a consumer is a mediated convenience; strings of letters are automatically translated by intervening layers of software into
codes recognized by the machines that comprise the search system.62 Presumably, a computer-savvy Google searcher could enter searches formulated in ASCII63 or hexadecimal code equivalent64 to the symbolic strings of letters constituting
“Rescuecom” or “U-Haul” and retrieve the same results, including the same keyword advertisements. Such coded strings
would not be immediately recognizable as trademarks, although they would be the logical and technical equivalents of
“Rescuecom” or “U-Haul,” holding the same search relationships as the versions that are more readily recognized by a lay
searcher. Layering the trademarks on top of such symbolic
strings adds a measure of user-friendliness to the search mechanism, and also adds the complication of trademark source
association, but the search function of the symbols that are entered remains exactly the same.
Thus, at one level, search terms are human-recognizable
strings of letters that appear to comprise a trademark. At
another level, the domain name or search term represents a series of sequences of bits that may be portrayed as the ones and
zeroes of binary code.65 The representation in binary itself portrays a series of voltages that are manipulated across the circuits of a computer’s hardware.66 These differing levels of representation constitute a convenience; search engine users do
not need to know programming languages, much less have to
manually set the logic gates of a computer to perform a
search—as was the case with the earliest computers, where
programming was done by physically setting switches by
hand.67 Software that is largely incomprehensible and inaccessible to the lay user does most of the complicated logical and
physical work that goes on within the device.68 But it should be
clear that the terms that are entered into the search mechan62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
(2000).
68.

See GRALLA, supra note 27, at 187–89.
See PETZOLD, supra note 58, at 286–92.
See id. at 183–89.
See id. at 69–85.
See RON WHITE, HOW COMPUTERS WORK 45 (8th ed. 2006).
DANIEL APPLEMAN, HOW COMPUTER PROGRAMMING WORKS 14 –15
See id.
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ism are part of the device, and are themselves operational devices in the process of information indexing and search. They
are very much “cybermarks” in the sense of controlling or mediating the function of a machine.
B. MARKS THAT BEHAVE
One initial objection to this characterization of cybermarks
might be that it is overly reductionist. So metatags or keywords
or domain names are in fact strings of bits that appear as a
mark; but perhaps by the same logic confusing advertisements
or counterfeit labels are collections of atoms that appear as a
mark, and perhaps the former should be just as objectionable to
the trademark holder as the latter? This objection is fairly easily answered: mere display of a trademark is static; billboards
and labels are not mechanisms of search in the same sense that
a metatag or domain name is. Cybermarks, like other software
scripts, are strings of code that “behave.”69 Billboards or labels
are substrates that carry information that can be associated in
the mind of the consumer with product source; but they do not
themselves execute a process of association.
The distinction between static trademarks and dynamic
cybermarks, between association of concepts in the “wetware”70
of the consumer’s brain and the association of code in the
hardware or software of data processors, is critical to sorting
out the problem of Internet trademark controversies. The software behind search engines, domain name servers, and keyword advertising implements an associational logic between the
formal representation of certain symbols and other stored information. It is part of the system that sequences, orders, and
routes information in data processing—what Yochai Benkler
has dubbed the “logical layer” of an information technology, as
opposed to the “physical layer” or substrate on which the information is carried, and the “content layer” or substantive information that is carried by the logical and physical layers.71
Benkler’s hierarchy offers a handy rubric for conceptualizing
69. See Samuelson et al., supra note 5, at 2316–20.
70. “Wetware” is “the human brain or a human being considered
esp[ecially] with respect to human logical and computational capabilities.”
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1423 (11th ed. 2003).
71. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED.
COMM. L.J. 561, 562 (2000); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 23–25 (2001) (applying the layers concept to different communications media).
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the structure of digital media72 and for recognizing the general
roles played by different components in a data processing system.
Of course the division between the logical layer and the
physical layer of an information system is never so pristine as
Benkler’s hierarchy might on its face seem to suggest. The logic
functions of the machine, while conceptually separable from its
apparatus, may in fact be constituted by the physical layer. The
logic of the machine may be embedded in the physical apparatus that makes up the machine, as in the case of an old-style
gear-driven adding machine,73 or in the differential voltages
across the circuits of a semiconductor chip.74 In current computing devices, separating the logical design of software from the
material design of hardware can be problematic; the two are
inextricably intertwined.75 Indeed, it is well-understood in
computer design that software and hardware are largely interchangeable for coding purposes.76 Data processing functions
can be implemented as either software or hardware, software
being somewhat easier to change.77 But conceptually we can see
that data processors do have an intrinsic logic, even if it is distributed across different components of the system.
This distinction similarly bears on the objection that the
characterization I have offered for “cybermarks” might be offered, at least to some extent, of perceptible, wholly communicative marks that are carried by digital media. A trademark logo
displayed on a computer screen, or an advertising jingle played
over a computer speaker, can be represented as source code
72. Or for that matter, almost any media. For example, one could equally
well conceptualize a printed book in the same fashion, constituting a physical
layer (paper, stitching, covers), a logical layer (chapters, pagination, paragraphs, grammar, and syntax) and a content layer (the subject and meaning of
the printed text). Cf. LESSIG, supra note 71, at 24 (demonstrating how the layers approach can be applied to a variety of different communications systems).
73. Or more elaborately, in the gear-driven analog calculations of the “difference engines” designed by Charles Babbage, but not built until more than a
century after his death. See PETZOLD, supra note 58, at 240; DORON SWADE,
THE DIFFERENCE ENGINE: CHARLES BABBAGE AND THE QUEST TO BUILD THE
FIRST COMPUTER 1–6 (2000).
74. PETZOLD, supra note 58, at 247–49; WHITE, supra note 66, at 45, 58–
59.
75. Cf. Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984
DUKE L.J. 663, 680 (describing the “complex hierarchy of programs and hardware” that work together as a “virtual machine”).
76. See Samuelson et al., supra note 5, at 2319.
77. See PETZOLD, supra note 58, at 232.
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script, as machine readable binary, and at some level comprise
sets of voltages across the circuits of a microchip.78 Yet these
digitized trademark representations are not functional in the
same sense as the key words or domain names under consideration here. Even at the machine level, trademark representations are not part of Benkler’s “logical layer.” Display output
may be more amenable to classification as “content” or “data”
rather than as part of the computer software, although distinctions between software and data are always difficult to draw.79
Content storage always incorporates instructions for reproducing the content to the extent that displayed trademarks might
be regarded as constituting computer instructions, they are trivially so, no more so than any other digitized information must
be. Certainly they are not constitutive of the relational architecture of the machine.
In the case of search engines or domain names, or even
pop-up advertisements, the logic of the device reflects the mental associations of the information it indexes, stores, and retrieves. To be useful as a search device, the database attempts
to map and replicate the most likely associations that will occur
in the mind of the user. The difficulty in the Internet trademark cases is the proper status of trademarks, typically word
marks, within an information storage and retrieval system. The
question that is squarely presented is whether translating a
consumer’s mental associations regarding a trademark term into an indexing apparatus can somehow constitute trademark
infringement, and thus whether the owner can object to the use
of the mark and its logical relations as a part of an associational apparatus.
C. THE LOGIC OF SEARCH
The temptation to answer too quickly the question in the
affirmative—as occurred with the domain name cases80—stems
from the fact that trademarks are themselves based upon certain mental associations.81 Trademarks have always been in
some sense the instruments of search and indexing, for assist78. See id. at 260–62.
79. See Dan L. Burk, The Mereology of Digital Copyright, 18 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 711, 724 (2008).
80. See supra Part II.A.
81. Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in 60 Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 508–17 (2008) (reviewing and critiquing neuroscientific studies on trademark associations).
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ing consumers in sorting through the different competing products in the market. The most prevalent economic theories regarding trademarks hold that they are useful for reducing consumer search costs.82 The stated value of a mark, and its
eligibility for trademark protection, lies in the association of
the symbol with some producer of goods or services.83 It is the
logic of the relation between symbol and source that constitutes
distinctiveness or “secondary” meaning, the necessary criteria
for protection of a mark.84 Infringement consists of inducing or
encouraging a new and unauthorized association between the
mark and a different product or source, an association that
might disrupt the logical link between symbol, product, and
source.85
But there are myriad other associations, unrecognized by
trademark law, that remain beyond the remedies of trademark
law. As with any symbol, the associations that attach to a
trademark are not monovalent.86 The Coca-Cola Company has
not authorized, and probably does not approve of, its mark being associated with osteoporosis,87 obesity,88 or American imperialism,89 but trademark law does not properly provide a remedy for such unwanted associations. Such nonsource associations
are integral to the logic of search. Search logic maps the associations most likely to locate desired information, and such associations are not necessarily those between mark and source.
82. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 2:5 (“Another important economic
function of trademarks is that they reduce the customer’s cost of collecting information about products.”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A Lemley, Trademarks
and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 786–88
(2004).
83. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 3:4.
84. See 2 id. § 11:2 (discussing the meaning and importance of “distinctiveness”); id. § 15:1 (introducing “second meaning”).
85. See 4 id. § 23:1.
86. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as
Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 412–24 (1990)
(discussing multiple uses of trademark words in language).
87. See, e.g., Fernando Guerrero-Romero et al., Consumption of Soft
Drinks with Phosphoric Acid as a Risk Factor for the Development of Hypocalcemia in Postmenopausal Women, 52 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1007, 1008
(1999).
88. Vasanti S. Malik et al., Intake of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and
Weight Gain: A Systematic Review, 84 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 274, 275–82
(2006); Lenny R. Vartanian et al., Effects of Soft Drink Consumption on Nutrition and Health: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 97 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 667, 669–70 (2007).
89. Ted Friedman, The World of the World of Coca-Cola, 19 COMM. RES.
642, 649 (1992) (criticizing Coca-Cola’s ethnocentrist ideology).
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Every designator in the language is subject to multivalent logical associations, some within the contemplation of trademark
law and most beyond it, but all of which are necessary to the
function of indexing. The marks “Coca-Cola” and “Pepsi-Cola”
are surely related in the minds of consumers, and properly so:
the brands are likely associated as business rivals, as market
alternatives, as subcategories of the genre of “soft drinks” or
“soda-pop.”90 These associations are entirely distinct from the
trademark concern of associating Coca-Cola with the source of
Pepsi-Cola or vice versa. Taking account of such associations is
properly part of the design of search logic, whether or not they
are part of the design of trademark logic.
To some extent, the character of the automated search
technology associated with cybermarks may tend to obscure
this logic. But the issue obscured by automated technology can
be isolated by translating the logic of association into analogous
older technologies. When considered in an offline, nonautomated context, the proposition of protecting an index function becomes less appealing, even absurd. Google keyword advertising, or When-U browser pop-up advertising, place a competitor’s advertisement in close proximity to a given mark,
generating an automated display that is triggered by an association with that mark. But as previous commentators have
pointed out, such proximity based on association would not be
considered at all unusual or legally objectionable in hardcopy
indices.91 Competitors’ advertising routinely appears in close
proximity in a variety of print media, such as catalogs or directories.92 Indeed, commercial producers might well intentionally
take out paid advertising space near the listing of a rival producer in a magazine or yellow pages telephone directory, and
may well expect that their advertisement will draw more eyes
or garner more attention due to its proximity near that of a
well-known competitor. Physical proximity creates an association between the concepts, but not necessarily an association as
to source.
A similar result follows in a context without advertising,
but where, as in the case of metatags or domain names, infor90. See generally J.C. LOUIS & HARVEY Z. YAZIJIAN, THE COLA WARS
(1980) (chronicling the history of and competition between the Coca-Cola
Company and PepsiCo, Inc.).
91. See, e.g., Greg Lastowka, Google’s Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327,
1401–02 (2008).
92. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 82, at 809.
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mational items are indexed according to their association with
a mark. This would be the case for an old-fashioned library
card catalog or print encyclopedia where entries are indexed by
keyword. Such keywords might be expected to include trademarks, say for example, “Coca-Cola.” The index might well include references pointing to materials that include competitors’
marks, to materials unrelated to the relationship between
product and source, or to materials objectionable to the mark
holder. The logic of search might well dictate that a “Coca-Cola”
entry be associated not merely with generic terms such as “soft
drink” or “soda pop,” or with “Atlanta,” but with “James Cagney” and “Billy Wilder,”93 or even “cocaine,”94 as well also with
other manufacturers’ products, including its rival soft drink
producer, “Pepsi-Cola.”95
It seems plainly absurd to allow a trademark holder to enjoin or restrict the use of its trademark as a keyword or search
term to locate materials logically associated with that mark in
a telephone directory, business index, or card catalog. It is unclear why it should matter to us if the catalog, rather than
composed of paper leaves or pasteboard cards, is modernized
into an automated online index. And it is equally unclear why
in either instance we should care if one advertiser or the other
paid to have their entry in the index. Courts reviewing the
Google Adwords program seem offended that advertisers can
pay to have their competitor’s marks flagged as search terms,96
but this seems a judicious way to ration search resources and
maintain the logic of search. An ambitious advertiser might
well prefer that his ads appear no matter what search terms
are entered into the database, but requiring a payment for each
search term flagged is precisely the strategy most likely to limit
the advertiser to designating only those terms relevant to the
advertiser’s potential customers.
93. Cinema star James Cagney’s last leading role was playing a Coca-Cola
executive in Cold War West Berlin in the comedy film One, Two, Three, directed by Billy Wilder. ONE, TWO, THREE (Mirisch Company 1961). The film
contains frequent references to both the Coca-Cola product and the Coca-Cola
company. See id.
94. The original formulation of Coca-Cola contained nontrivial doses of
cocaine. MARK PENDERGRAST, FOR GOD, COUNTRY, AND COCA-COLA: THE DEFINITIVE HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SOFT DRINK AND THE COMPANY
THAT MAKES IT 53 (2d ed. 2000).
95. See LOUIS & YAZIJIAN, supra note 90, at 80.
96. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129–30 (2d
Cir. 2009).
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The only relevant association for purposes of trademark
law is one that connects mark with source, and the only relevant objection under trademark law is a substitution of that association with another source association that would confuse or
deceive consumers.97 There is a large number of logical associations that might legitimately arise between a mark and other
referents, and the majority of those associations have little to
do with the source association or “secondary meaning” of the
mark.98 Certainly trademark owners might desire control over
every association with their marks, and there has been an unfortunate movement by some courts in the direction of such
control.99 However, not all associations with a trademark are
the subject of trademark protection, nor actionable as infringement, nor under the control of the trademark holder. Despite the recent tendency of courts to view trademark ownership as encompassing an exclusive “right to evoke”100
associations with the mark, trademark law of necessity recognizes that some logical associations besides the association to
source are inevitable, necessary, and even desirable. Thus, the
trademark doctrines of nominative use, fair use, and trademark
use, while constituting a somewhat confused and confusing
welter of overlapping legal standards,101 share the common
quality of excluding from the ambit of trademark exclusivity
nonsource associations of the mark. Such nonsource association, whether by proximity or logical relation, cannot be the basis for infringement.
III. COMPARATIVE INTERMEZZO
This observation—that the strings of symbols used for domain names, metatags, and search terms are simultaneously
functional and communicative—should likely come as no surprise.102 Copyright law has struggled with essentially the same
97. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN.
L. REV. 413, 415 (2010).
98. See Dreyfuss, supra note 86, at 400–02.
99. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law
Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1670–71 (2007); Mark A.
Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L.J. 1687, 1697–713 (1999).
100. Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291,
292–98 (2003).
101. See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 49, 51 (2008).
102. See David McGowan, From Social Friction to Social Meaning: What
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problem for at least the last three decades, since the commercial proliferation of computer software technology in the midtwentieth century.103 Patent law, too, has had a similarly uneasy relationship with computer code as subject matter.104 The
prior difficulties in these areas of intellectual property are instructive with regard to the problem of cybermarks.
A. FUNCTIONAL SUBJECT MATTER
Congress explicitly placed computer software within the
purview of the copyright statute,105 which had previously been
thought to encompass only artistic and cultural works,106 and
which continues to entail strong prohibitions against copyright
protection for useful articles.107 Indeed, the copyright rule
against utilitarian subject matter stretches back at least to the
celebrated Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Selden.108 In
Baker, the Court asserted that utilitarian innovations such as
the accounting method at issue in the case are matters for patent law and belong in the Patent Office, not in the copyright
system.109
The copyright prohibition against utilitarian works also
appears in the specific statutory prohibition on extending the
category of “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” to encompass useful articles—the place where the prohibition was
traditionally most likely to collide with copyrightable subject
matter.110 Works in this category are often constructed around
some functional artifact. The rule developed for dealing with
the collision between copyright in the work and the prohibition
on copyright for the functional embodiment has been that if the
esthetic or artistic portion of an item is physically or concepExpressive Uses of Code Tell Us About Free Speech, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1515,
1536 (2003) (arguing that “all expression is functional”). Unfortunately,
McGowan’s claim quickly slides into the fallacy of functionality that I identify
below. See discussion infra Parts V.A–B.
103. See Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent Theory for the Copyright Protection
of Computer Software and Recent Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CIN. L. REV.
53, 56–66, 105–12 (1997).
104. See Samuelson, supra note 75, at 756–60.
105. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2006).
106. See Karjala, supra note 103, at 77.
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). See generally Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Excludes Systems and Processes from the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1921 (2007) (discussing the history and meaning of § 102(b)).
108. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
109. Id. at 102.
110. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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tually separable from the functional portion, copyright may extend to the former portion.111 But where the two are inseparable, the entire item becomes anathema to copyright, and the
entire work becomes ineligible for copyright protection.112 Some
argue that this rule has little application to software, as it
seems directed to three-dimensional, prehendable types of artifacts.113 But in the age of data processing, it became clear that
texts, too, could be functional in the mechanistic, operational
sense of that term.114
If copyright is inimical to functional works, and software is
clearly a functional work, then why place computer software
within the ambit of copyright? Congress apparently viewed
software as a kind of “literary work” comprised of symbolic indicia.115 And indeed programmers do “read” and “write” computer source code in “languages” that can be understood by
other programmers.116 But to focus on source code is to see only
half the story. Notwithstanding its amenability to instantiation
as source code, software is unquestionably a utilitarian article,
designed to execute the functions of a machine.117 Source code
cannot be used by the machine; it is compiled or interpreted into machine-readable object code that the computer can execute.118 At the same time, source code is not merely a representation of the object code; it is an active text that affects the
workings of a machine.119 It is itself, as some commentators
have phrased it, a machine built of text.120
Consequently, early litigants challenging copyright in
computer software sought to limit the extent of copyright protection to the communicative versions of software texts—to
111. Id.; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (stating that copyright protection only applies if
the “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features . . . can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of
the article”).
113. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Four Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of Copyright over Sui Generis Protection of Computer Software, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2559, 2567–68 (1994) (arguing that the separation of an article’s artistic elements from its utilitarian aspects is applicable to artwork,
but not to computer programs).
114. See Samuelson et al., supra note 5, at 2316.
115. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
116. See PETZOLD, supra note 58, at 352–53.
117. See Samuelson, supra note 75, at 683.
118. See APPLEMAN, supra note 67, at 149.
119. See Samuelson, supra note 75, at 680–81.
120. See Samuelson et al., supra note 5, at 2320.
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source code that was intended to be read by humans, or to applications that were intended to interact with humans.121 The
argument was that copyright was traditionally intended to protect works that conveyed ideas or information to people: books,
paintings, sculptures, maps, movies, sheet music.122 So if software were to be included within the copyright canon, it ought
to be included only to the extent that it similarly communicated.123 Source code might be said to communicate as a text,
but machine-readable object code does not; it is part of the machine and purely functional.124 Programs like word processors
and spreadsheets also convey information to humans, but operating systems do not; they are purely part of the internal, unregarded function of the machine.125 So perhaps a line could be
drawn between communicative and functional software texts.126
Unfortunately the line was not so pristine, and drawing it
proved impossible as a policy matter. Most software is distributed to consumers as object code; source code is generally not
commercially circulated.127 Protecting source code while leaving
object code unprotected would create the perverse situation
where the machine-readable form of the program, which is the
form typically distributed to consumers, would be vulnerable to
copying, whereas the human-readable version, which is typically held proprietary, would be the protected version.128 Consequently, courts quickly extended copyright protection to the object code form of programs, causing enormous mischief in an
intellectual property system designed for expressive works.129
After decades of litigation, software jurisprudence has settled
121. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d
870, 876–77 (3d Cir. 1982); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.,
524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
122. See Apple Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d at 1249; Williams Elecs., 685 F.2d
at 876–77.
123. See Apple Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d at 1248; Williams Elecs., 685 F.2d
at 876–77.
124. See Samuelson, supra note 75, at 683.
125. See id. at 678–79.
126. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int’l Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523–24
(9th Cir. 1984).
127. Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 196–97 (1992).
128. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 134 (2000).
129. See Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the New
Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS 33, 64 –65, 76–77 (1987); Samuelson, supra
note 75, at 668–69.
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into an uneasy equilibrium where computer programs remain
protected by copyright, but only minimally so; where exact copying of the code remains prohibited, but little protection is offered beyond that.130
Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden, the solution might seem to be to place software in the patent system.131 But I have argued in previous work that patent
law faces the corollary and inverse problem to that of software
in the copyright system.132 Patent law is explicitly directed to
creations such as machines, processes, and materials that are
utilitarian or functional in nature.133 But due to the convergence of functional and communicative texts, patent law has
inexorably begun to encompass nonfunctional subject matter,
texts that it was not intended to cover and which it accommodates poorly.134 Software is again the primary culprit: a text
that functions as part of a machine is a utilitarian article, but
one that can be communicative to humans due to its symbolic
quality. In its machine-readable state, software seems most
like patentable subject matter, but in its programming language representation it seems least like patentable subject
matter.135 Because symbolic representations are functional in a
data-processing environment, they cannot be easily assigned to
a subject-matter category.136
But the difficulty for patent law is far more fundamental
than the incorporation of symbolic source code into patentable
subject matter. Because software is a text-based technology, it
can encompass anything that can be described by human language.137 This textual character opens the door to scripting
130. See Samuelson, supra note 75, at 754 –55.
131. See Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent
Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39
EMORY L.J. 1025, 1142–47 (1990).
132. See Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH
L. REV. 587, 608–11 [hereinafter Burk, Method]; Dan L. Burk, The Problem of
Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561, 589–90 (2006) [hereinafter
Burk, Problem of Process].
133. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining patentable subject matter).
134. See Burk, supra note 128, at 136–41.
135. See Samuelson, supra note 131, at 1040–41.
136. See J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475, 507–08 (1995); Samuelson et al., supra note 5, at 2343–45.
137. See Phil Agre, Internet Research: For and Against, in 1 INTERNET RESEARCH ANNUAL: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF INTERNET RE-
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functions that encompass everything from aesthetic or communicative texts to textual machines that constitute music or images or other artistic works.138 Indeed, digitized art, text, and
music are now routinely stored and manipulated in precisely
this fashion; the digital files that do so are not merely storage
media, they may be executable computer code.139 Thus ostensibly aesthetic works are potentially swept within the ambit of
an intellectual property regime that was intended for functional works.140
Additionally, accommodating software within patent law
has required the distortion or abandonment of doctrines that
once policed the line between communication and function.141
Patent law’s printed matter doctrine long held that symbolic
indicia could not be the subject of a patent; but this prohibition
had to give way for software and other coded functional artifacts to receive patent protection.142 More salient to the discussion here is patent law’s “mental steps” doctrine: patent law
long held that inventions whose claims incorporated “mental
steps” of calculation, estimation, or other cognitive functions
were not legitimate subject matter for patents.143 This prohibition included both a practical dimension—namely: how to enforce a patent that is infringed in the mind—as well as a theoretical dimension—is there not a First Amendment problem, let
alone a general public policy problem, in patenting thought?144
But the proliferation of data processing technologies rapidly compromised the viability of this subject-matter exclusion.145
Processes and machines, including processes and machines for
manipulating data, are ostensibly part of patentable subject
matter. As I have detailed elsewhere, the inclusion of software
SEARCHERS CONFERENCES 2000–2002, at 25, 27 (Mia Consalvo et al. eds.,
2004).
138. Burk, supra note 128, at 120–21.
139. See Anthony L. Clapes, Confessions of an Amicus Curiae: Technophobia, Law, and Creativity in the Digital Arts, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 903, 943
(1994).
140. See John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C.
L. REV. 1139, 1163 (1999).
141. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought, 60 SMU L. REV.
317, 351 (2007); Thomas, supra note 140, at 1160.
142. See Burk, supra note 128, at 141–45; Collins, supra note 141, at 351.
143. See Norman D. McClaskey, The Mental Process Doctrine: Its Origin,
Legal Basis, and Scope, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1148, 1162–80 (1970).
144. See Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855, 879–82 (2007).
145. See Burk, supra note 128, at 143; Collins, supra note 141, at 351.
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within patentable subject matter eroded the distinctions drawn
under the mental steps doctrine; drafting claims that would
read on silicon data processing without including carbon data
processing proved an impossible semantic exercise.146 Thus the
mental steps doctrine has become primarily a historical curiosity in modern patent law, but the breakdown of that doctrine
has returned to bedevil patent subject matter jurisprudence.147
B. MIND AND MACHINE
The “mental steps” problem in patent law is a specific formulation of a now-generalized problem of intellectual property:
how or whether to separate the workings of silicon memory devices from the analogous workings of carbon memory devices—
that is to say, to separate computer data processing from the
analogous workings of the brain.148 It is present in copyright as
well as patent law. When considering the nature of copying in
copyright law, it is clear that people who read or view texts
must be in some fashion “copying” them into human memory as
they do so—humans who have viewed or read texts can visualize them, remember them, even reproduce them after the
viewed text is removed from sight.149 Computer devices also
make temporary copies of such works in the course of
processing or communicating them, and a number of courts
have held that such copies in computer memory are unauthorized “copies” for purposes of copyright infringement.150 But
mental images have in contrast never been considered to constitute unauthorized copies of a work; reproducing a copyrighted work from memory into another tangible medium may
146. See Burk, supra note 128, at 100–01.
147. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124,
134 –36 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal). As of this writing, the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir.
2008), cert granted, Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009), which may well address some aspects of this issue.
148. Collins, supra note 141, at 344 –45.
149. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp.
177, 180–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that reproduction from memory, even
inadvertently, may constitute infringement), aff’d, 722 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1983).
150. Compare MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517–
18 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that temporarily loading software into RAM constitutes fixation), and Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1012
(7th Cir. 1983) (holding that video game output was sufficiently fixed in the
circuit board to permit copyright protection), with NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom MidAm., Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 236 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding no fixation of software in a
dedicated computer terminal).
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be infringement, but the copy in the reader’s gray matter is not
itself an infringement.151
It should be clear that at a fundamental level the “cybermarks” problem in trademark law is yet another version of the
“mental steps” problem. The logic of search is the logic of human cognition, embedded in data processing devices. The appellate court in 1-800 Contacts came very close to articulating a
trademark version of this mental steps consideration with its
observation that “a company’s internal utilization of a trademark in a way that does not communicate it to the public is
analogous to an individual’s private thoughts about a trademark.”152 The precise question the court was considering was
the unobserved use of a string of bits representing the trademark; like the early copyright software cases the question is
couched in the context of “communication” to a human.153 But
the implication of the court’s analogy is that mental correlation
of a trademark, even if unauthorized, or to a product not issued
by the trademark source, is unactionable.
While trademark shares with patent and copyright the
problem of externalizing and propertizing “mental steps,” the
irony of trademark law is that the conceptual movement from
silicon to carbon data processing is reversed. In patent and copyright, the doctrinal concern is to avoid extending intellectual
property protection to thought or to mental steps; the difficulty
is to include machine functions within the respective sets of intellectual property rights, while excluding analogous cognitive
processes. By contrast, in trademark, the doctrinal concern is to
avoid extending intellectual property protection to machine
functions while protecting certain analogous cognitive
processes: it is the association of mark and source in the mind
of the consumer that is protected under trademark law, whereas the instantiation of such associations in an apparatus such
as a card catalog or index ought not be protected.
In either case, drawing a line between analogous mental
and mechanical functions is foregrounded by the advent of automated indexing systems. As I have suggested, the problem
surely existed in previous index media, such as a card catalog.154 In patent law, the problem was long apparent because
151.
152.
2005).
153.
154.

See Burk, Method, supra note 132, at 611.
1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 409 (2d Cir.
See supra notes 42–49 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 93–95.
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the subject matter of patent explicitly includes processes, and
processes implemented on paper and other physical media required the distinctions drawn in the written matter and mental
steps doctrines.155 In copyright the trouble became apparent
more recently, when the separation between cognitive and mechanical functions could no longer be maintained as part of a
distinction between utilitarian and expressive works.156 The
problem has lain latent for a good decade and half in trademark law, but the strings of code that I have called cybermarks
embroil trademark law, too, in the same perplexity over information technologies.
C. COMMUNICATION AND FUNCTION
Neither has the problem of dividing expression from function been confined to intellectual property law; it has spilled
over into other areas of what we might broadly term “information law.” For example, the problem of distinguishing expression from function has similarly arisen in a series of lawsuits
evaluating software under the speech and publication guarantees of the First Amendment.157 In these lawsuits, computer
science experts challenged federal software security restrictions
that prevented export of software that included strong encryption algorithms.158 Oddly, the government was willing to permit
export of books or other print materials displaying such algorithms, but prohibited export of the identical computer programs.159 The export restrictions were challenged on the theory
that software constitutes a form of speech that is entitled to
protection under the First Amendment: computer scientists
155. See supra notes 141–47 and accompanying text.
156. See Reichman, supra note 136, at 484 –85; see also Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy’s Approach to Information Products: Muscling Copyright
and Patent into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 SUP. CT. REV.
195, 208–09.
157. See Robert Plotkin, Fighting Keywords: Translating the First Amendment to Protect Software Speech, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 329, 329–31
& nn.5–10; Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 714 (2000); Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a
Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 629, 678–79 (2000).
158. See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2000); Bernstein v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1999); Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of
State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1996); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (explaining Defendant’s
First Amendment challenge to anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act).
159. Junger, 209 F.3d at 484; Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 3.
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communicate ideas about computer programs in the form of
computer code, and the plaintiffs in the cases sought the freedom to share encryption algorithm code with other computer
scientists.160
Courts reviewing the federal export restrictions concluded
that computer code is both communicative and functional, and
deserving of First Amendment protection, although at a level of
scrutiny that would allow substantial governmental regulation.161 In attempting to discern whether software is functional
or communicative, some courts engaged in this analysis looked
to the expressive nature of copyright.162 This reasoning drew
upon the inclusion of software within copyright to conclude that
software, like other copyrightable subject matter, must be expressive for purposes of copyright, and so must likewise be expressive for First Amendment purposes.163 The holdings of the
software export cases were then subsequently relied on in copyright cases challenging intellectual property restrictions on the
use and dissemination of software, bringing the expression discussion full circle.164
At least a glimmering of this same distinction was identified by the courts in a dispute between Name.Space, Inc. and
Network Solutions, the designated authority for administering
Internet domain names.165 Name.Space had sought to develop a
set of new top-level domains, or TLDs, alternative to the familiar .com, .net, and related legacy TLDs.166 Name.Space claimed
antitrust and First Amendment violations when Network Solutions and its federal sponsor, the National Science Foundation,
refused to recognize the new TLDs as part of the DNS technological infrastructure.167 In particular, Name.Space asserted
that the new domain names constituted a type of protected
speech, and the failure of the government and its contractor to

160. See Junger, 209 F.3d at 483–84; Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 922
F. Supp. 1426, 1434 (N.D. Cal 1996).
161. E.g., Junger, 209 F.3d at 484 –85.
162. E.g., Bernstein, 922 F. Supp. at 1436.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d
Cir. 2001) (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d
294, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
165. Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573 (2d Cir.
2000).
166. Id. at 577, 579.
167. Id. at 579–80.
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recognize the new domain names constituted a kind of illegitimate prior restraint.168
At the district court level, the First Amendment question
was analyzed as a choice between communication and functionality, under an analogy between domain names and telephone
numbers.169 The district court held that domain names were
functional rather than communicative, a routing instruction for
computers.170 In reviewing the distinction drawn by the district
court, the appellate court correctly noted that domain names
are “not susceptible to such a uniform, monolithic characterization.”171 Much as had been decided in cases involving software
export, the court reasoned that functionality does not necessarily make a string of symbols noncommunicative, or place it outside the ambit of the First Amendment.172 In reaching this conclusion, the court adopted a comparison to license plates or to
telephone numbers, opining that although such symbolic indicia are functional, they can also be communicative, as in the
case of “vanity” license plates or telephone numbers.173
This analysis likely reaches the right conclusion, although
not entirely by the correct route. The court’s analogy to license
plates illustrates why we must be careful with the term “functional.” Injudicious use of the term can lead to confusion and
analytical error. License plates are vehicle identifiers, and so
are always communicative—that is their “function” in a broad
sense of the term. But they are never functional in the sense
that software or a useful artifact is functional; they are not
physically operative; they do not “behave.” The purpose of a license plate is to communicate either the numerical identifier of
a vehicle, or an incidental message that is layered on the string
of identifying symbols, or both.174 As the terminology of the
copyright statute might put it, the “utility” of a license plate is
to convey information or to portray itself.175 But having a com168. See id. at 580, 584, 587.
169. See id. at 580 (citing PGMedia, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 51 F.
Supp. 2d 389, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)); cf. Burk, supra note 12, ¶ 52 (discussing
the analogy between domain names and alphanumeric telephone codes).
170. See Name.Space, 202 F.3d at 584.
171. See id. at 585.
172. See id.; cf. supra notes 157–61 and accompanying text (describing the
software export cases).
173. See Name.Space, 202 F.3d at 585–86.
174. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716–17 (1977).
175. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“A ‘useful article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the

1404

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[94:1375

municative use or function does not make a license plate functional in the relevant sense of that term.
The unrecognized distinction between the Court’s two examples suggests that it may be desirable to distinguish between “communicative” symbols and “expressive” symbols, at
least for First Amendment purposes.176 The court’s opinion
suggests that it conflated communication with functionality. As
identifiers, license plates are clearly communicative, although
not necessarily expressive in the senses contemplated by the
First Amendment; the plates do not have a particularized message but merely designate a particular vehicle. Vanity plates
will tend to be communicative as well as expressive in the First
Amendment sense, conveying not only vehicle identity, but also
a particularized message.177 We might add that neither type of
plate is likely to be expressive in the copyright sense of the
term; the strings of symbols are probably not original works of
authorship.178 But certainly neither type of plate is functional
in an operational sense.
The court’s comparison to telephone numbers, however,
seems better considered, as telephone numbers come closer to
incorporating both the functional and communicative aspects
the court was attempting to illustrate. Telephone numbers are
logical representations of the telephone switching system, indicating either a location or the name of a device on the telephone
network.179 Although they are somewhat arbitrary in that other
symbols might have been adopted to indicate names and locations, telephone numbers instantiate and initiate the physical
operation of the system. They may, as the court suggested,
have layered on top of them some communicative message or
association.180 Much of this communication will be due to the
association of the numbers with letters on the telephone keypad, or due to the association certain numbers have in other
article or to convey information.”).
176. Cf. Burk, supra note 128, at 126 (noting that “expression” for copyright purposes may not necessarily be “expression” for First Amendment purposes).
177. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 705; Roach v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 864 (8th
Cir. 2009); Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor
Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 614 (4th Cir. 2002).
178. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363–
64 (1991) (holding telephone numbers are unoriginal factual data).
179. See Burk, supra note 12, ¶ 32.
180. See Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584 –84
(2d Cir. 2000).
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contexts.181 In other words, it is the translation of human cognitive associations onto a functional device that gives rise to
the same set of concerns, whether on telephones or in search
engines, and whether characterized as a matter of First
Amendment, copyright, patent, or trademark law.
IV. FUNCTIONALITY DOCTRINE
Discussion of functionality issues in patent and in copyright and even the jurisprudence of the First Amendment,
brings us to a discussion of the functionality doctrine in trademark law. Black-letter trademark law specifies that functional
articles are not protectable as trademarks.182 The partition of
subject matter between trademark and patent is perhaps even
more explicit in trademark doctrine than the partition between
patent and copyright in Baker v. Selden.183 If cybermarks are
indeed functional strings of computer code, functionality doctrine should have something to say about their treatment as
trademarks; specifically, it likely says that they are precluded
from receiving trademark protection.
A. DEFINITIONAL CAUTIONS
In considering trademark functionality doctrine, we must
take some care with our definitions. As we have seen, the
Name.Space opinion underscores the need to separate communication, expression, and function.184 In copyright, the definitional problem has presented itself in terms of “utility” or “useful articles,” which are purportedly outside the ambit of
copyright.185 But works that are clearly within copyright are also clearly “useful” in some sense of that term: books are useful
for recording and communicating information, paintings are
useful for hanging on walls, and so on.186 So the distinction we
have been considering has been couched by some commentators
in terms of function: software functions in an operational sense,
whereas paintings and poetry do not.187
181. See Burk, supra note 12, ¶ 57.
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2006); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514
U.S. 159, 164 –65 (1995).
183. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 176–78.
185. See supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
186. Dan L. Burk, Expression, Selection, Abstraction: Copyright’s Golden
Braid, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 593, 601 (2005).
187. See Karjala, supra note 103, at 57–58.
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Similarly, when it comes to trademark functionality, we
must not equate function with purpose or use in the broad
sense; in this sense, all trademarks have a function—to assist
consumers in identifying the source of goods or services in
commerce. Trademark law cannot exclude marks that are functional in this broad sense or it would eviscerate itself. Neither
can we afford to confuse communication with utilitarian function, as occurs, for example, in the McCarthy trademark treatise, where the author describes phrases such as “Shake Before
Using” and “Open Here” as functional.188 Such phrases are
communicative, but they do not “behave” in the same fashion as
a product configuration.189 Rather, what we are concerned with
in functionality are items that are functional in what McCarthy
terms the “engineering-type” or mechanical sense,190 items with
operational characteristics other than to communicate the
source of a product or service.
B. FUNCTIONALITY RATIONALES
Defining functionality in trademark law has been no easier
than it has been in other areas of intellectual property. Attempts to characterize the indicia for trademark functionality
have a history as long as the doctrine itself, which extends well
back into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.191
The iconic, germinal case remains the Supreme Court decision
in Kellog Co. v. National Biscuit Co.192 The developer of the cereal, whose interests had been acquired by the National Biscuit
Company (Nabisco),193 had held utility patents on the product
and production method for “pillow shaped” biscuits of shredded
wheat breakfast cereal.194 After the expiration of the patents,
when competitor Kellog began producing similar breakfast cereal biscuits,195 Nabisco sued for trademark infringement, arguing that during the period of patent exclusivity the public

188. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 7:83.
189. See Samuelson et al., supra note 5, at 2317–18.
190. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 7:64.
191. See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
192. 305 U.S. 111 (1938). For a detailed background on the case, see
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellog Co. v. National Biscuit Co.: Breakfast with Brandeis, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 220, 221–26 (Jane C.
Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
193. Kellog Co., 305 U.S. at 113–14.
194. Id. at 117.
195. See id. at 114.
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had come to associate the shape of the cereal with its source.196
Despite the fact that the biscuit shape might well have
achieved secondary meaning, the Supreme Court rejected the
trademark claim as an illegitimate attempt to extend the life of
the exclusive rights in the patent.197 One of the fundamental
policies underlying the patent system is that patented inventions are intended to become available to the public after a defined period of exclusivity.198 But, because trademark protection is effectively perpetual so long as the mark remains in use,
the Kellog Co. Court reasoned that allowing trademark claims
in the patented item would frustrate the policy of the patent
system.199
Over time, this reasoning from the Kellog case became a
mainstay of functionality doctrine: the existence of a utility patent on a given product configuration renders that configuration ineligible for trademark protection.200 A utility patent, particularly an expired utility patent directed to the subject matter
of the mark, is persuasive and, perhaps, conclusive evidence of
functionality.201 In some cases, the rationale for this result may
be the Supremacy Clause preemption of state trademark law by
the policy underlying the federal patent statute—to prevent a
sort of “evergreening” of patentable inventions.202 In other cases, it may be the constitutional override of federal or state
trademark law by the Patent and Copyright Clause in Article
I.203 At a minimum, the existence of a utility patent is taken as
strong evidence of functionality, either because an expert federal agency—the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO)—has deemed the configuration functional in issuing a
patent on it,204 or due to a kind of estoppel, in that the owner of
the patent on the configuration has previously represented to

196. See id. at 118.
197. Id. at 117–18.
198. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 31 (1964).
199. See Kellog Co., 305 U.S. at 120 (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg.
Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)).
200. See Dinwoodie, supra note 192, at 220.
201. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 7:89 (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc.
v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)).
202. See id. § 7:64.
203. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 52–53 (1st Cir.
1998).
204. TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29.
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the USPTO and to the world that the configuration is functional, by virtue of having pursued a patent for it.205
A second mainstay of functionality doctrine with roots in
the Kellog Co. case is the rationale of competitive need. This rationale holds that if access to a given configuration is necessary
to compete in the marketplace, that configuration must be
functional and so unavailable for trademark protection.206
Courts traditionally measured the competitive need by asking
whether the configuration in question was the sole configuration, or one of very few available, to compete in a given market;
if so, then trademark status would confer an improper monopoly on a needed configuration or structure.207 This test paralleled
in some sense the merger doctrine familiar in copyright: because copyright does not protect ideas, but only expression, if
there is only one way, or a very small number of alternative
ways, of expressing an idea, then granting a copyright would be
improper because it would effectively protect the idea.208 In
such cases idea and expression are said to have “merged” and
the policy of excluding ideas from copyright becomes paramount.209 One might similarly think about trademarks and
functionality “merging,” in which case the policy against protecting functional configurations becomes paramount.
However, as it has been in copyright, this formulation of
trademark competitive necessity has proven problematic. In
copyright, it is clear that a sufficiently clever adjudicator can
always find alternatives to a given expression—although not
necessarily very good alternatives. “See Spot run” might alternatively be expressed “Observe Spot perambulate,” even
though the latter hardly seems equivalent to the former in
terms of clarity, simplicity, and concision.210 If the mere presence of alternatives obviated copyright merger, there would
never be any findings of copyright merger. So, too, in trademarks, courts could nearly always find some alternative configuration, although perhaps not especially good alternative configurations, so that if the mere presence of alternatives

205.
206.
207.
208.
1967).
209.
210.

Id. at 31.
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995).
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 7:65.
See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678–79 (1st Cir.
See id.
See Burk, supra note 186, at 603.
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obviated functionality, there would never be any findings of
functionality.
But this approach was largely repudiated in the Supreme
Court’s more recent TrafFix Devices opinion.211 That case concerned the distinctive three-dimensional configuration of
springs on traffic signage, springs that were intended to hold
the sign upright in the wind.212 The springs had become identified with the initial manufacturer of such signs, but were also
clearly functional, and the subject of an expired utility patent.213 In a trade dress suit against a competitor that had
manufactured signs with similar springs, the Supreme Court
both reaffirmed the viability of functionality doctrine214 and
laid the competitive alternative doctrine to rest, at least as a
definitive test for eliminating functionality.215 The Court held
that the presence or absence of alternatives is not determinative of functionality: at best it is an indicator as to functionality.216 The Court instead emphasized the “engineering” indicia
of functionality.217 Alternatives or not, functionality hinges on
whether the item in question is utilitarian in a mechanical or
operational sense, and that is determined by considering the
use, purpose, or cost of the alleged source indicator, rather than
by considering possible alternatives.218
Cybermarks seem good candidates for functionality under
such an approach. Even under the “alternatives” approach, it is
difficult to see what practical alternatives exist to using trademarks as components of an index to related information. Under
the TrafFix Devices approach, we have seen that the use or
purpose of the character string is functional in a mechanical or
operational sense. As other circuit courts have formulated the
test, we might say that the employment of trademarks as the
human-readable interface in search technology seems to be a
“feature ‘dictated by the functions to be performed.’”219 Similar211. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33–34
(2001).
212. Id. at 25.
213. See id. at 34 –35.
214. See id. at 30.
215. See id. at 34 –35.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 31–32.
218. See id.
219. Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148
(2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331
(2d Cir. 1983)).
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ly, trademark keywords seem to be “essential to the use or purpose”220 of search technologies. The inability to employ trademarks in this fashion would create significant nonreputational
disadvantages221 for search technologies. Indeed, it is difficult
to imagine how they might be constructed in any other way.
V. SOME OBJECTIONS
While the controversies over function and expression in
other areas of intellectual property point the way to framing
the cybermark issue in trademark law, the history of those parallel discussions is admittedly not especially encouraging for
such an approach. The question of software copyright has
reached an uneasy state of détente only after decades of controversy, and the status of expressive works within patent law
remains contested. I frankly expect that courts will be skeptical
of a functionality analysis, and certainly trademark holders
will resist this approach. But on the remote chance that trademark law might embrace a measure of reason that has eluded
other areas of intellectual property, I consider a few of the likely objections to this approach.
A. WORDS AND CONFIGURATIONS
One objection to employing the functionality doctrine in the
context of cybermarks is that these are by and large word
marks, and functionality doctrine has never been applied to
word marks. Functionality has tended to apply to product configurations, the design of traffic sign springs,222 or the shape of
a breakfast cereal biscuit.223 As a matter of history and application, functionality doctrine has belonged to the tangible and
prehendable. The underlying assumption in this association
seems to be that artifacts that can be instantiated in three dimensions may be functional, as well as sometimes communicative,224 whereas words or symbols are always communicative
rather than functional. The exception to this limitation may be
the controversial doctrine of aesthetic functionality, holding
that marks may be “functional” if they are attractive or appeal220. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982).
221. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 174 (1995).
222. See supra notes 211–18 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 192–99 and accompanying text.
224. Cf. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 624 (1999) (arguing that
product designs regularly convey meaning to consumers).
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ing—which is of course controversial precisely because it contemplates a different meaning of functionality, incorporating
into its scope cognitive or cultural “functions” rather than purely physical operations.225
But my assertion here is that cybermarks, despite being
symbolic indicia, are functional in the core sense of that term
contemplated in trademark functionality, and not in the sense
of entailing aesthetic or cognitive appeal. As our review above
of utilitarian works in the copyright context has shown, symbolic indicia in a data processing environment are indeed functional in the sense of mediating physical operations and producing physical results.226 In this sense, my thesis is to some
extent the inverse of Professor Dinwoodie’s observation that
prehendable objects convey meaning and deserve treatment as
trademarks;227 I contend that in a data processing environment, symbolic indicia become functional and so may not deserve treatment as trademarks. It may be true that functionality has seldom been applied to word marks, but that is because
in the world of atoms, words do not “behave” functionally. But
in the world of bits they do, and functionality doctrine is fully
capable of encompassing functional words.
And although functionality doctrine has largely been applied to prehendable, three-dimensional product configurations,
there have been exceptions, even in the world of atoms. A few
cases have found two-dimensional marks to be functional. For
example, the Trademark Office denied registration to a configuration of marks on an answer sheet for test scoring—the
marks were intended to be optically scanned and so were
deemed functional.228 Similarly, trademark registration was
denied to a set of video game character configurations that
were dictated by the technical constraints of the display device;229 because the shapes were prescribed as a matter of engineering, they were deemed functional.230
Certainly the configuration of the optical scanning codes
could become associated with the source of the answer sheets,
225. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 50, § 7:79.
226. See supra Part III.A.
227. See Dinwoodie, supra note 192, at 216.
228. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 900, 916 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
229. Atari, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 816, 819 (T.T.A.B.
1982).
230. See id.
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but like the bar code labeling example I have mentioned previously, they are clearly a component of an information storage
and retrieval system,231 and are, therefore, functional. The
Trademark Board properly recognized this fact in denying the
code patterns trademark registration.232 Keyword search terms
are in a similar fashion components of an information storage
and retrieval system: patterns that trigger certain responses in
the system to display associated data. The alphabetic patterns
of these components may be recognized by consumers—even
readily recognized by consumers—as also forming word marks
associated with a source of goods. But like an optical scanning
answer key or UPC bar code, their function in the context of the
search engine is to trigger certain electromechanical responses.
Functionality doctrine is appropriate in both cases.
B. CONTEXT
A second concern regarding functionality might be its binary “either-or” quality. The trademark utility jurisprudence
has tended to treat functionality as immutable and inherent;
functional objects are functional in all times and all places.233
When an item is deemed functional it is categorically placed
outside the subject matter of trademark law.234 But functionality, in the sense of mechanical or physical operation, is necessarily context-specific, as analysis of the analogous question in
other areas of intellectual property has shown. In copyright law
this problem presents itself as the paradox of Duchamp’s urinal.235 In the men’s restroom, a urinal is surely a utilitarian device, functioning as a component of the plumbing. But if the
urinal is relocated into a museum or gallery as an object of
“found” art, as Duchamp did,236 it no longer performs this lavatory function. Divorced from the pipes, valves, spigots, and waterworks of the restroom, the ceramic fixture transitions from
waste disposal mechanism to a cultural artifact. If the artifact’s
label shifts from “urinal” to “fountain,” and its classification
shifts from commode to sculpture, does it become an expressive
231. See Moore, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 916.
232. See id. at 916–17.
233. Cf. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 31–32
(2001) (describing factors for determining functionality).
234. See id. at 30.
235. See Jeffrey Malkan, What Is a Copy?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
419, 436 (2005).
236. Id. at 437.
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work? And, more importantly, if it is now expressive, could it be
the subject matter of copyright?
In a similar vein, consider the traffic sign springs from the
TrafFix Devices case.237 Attached to a traffic sign, they are
clearly functional; they serve to hold the sign upright while
maintaining a degree of flexibility when the flat sign panel is
buffeted by the wind. Under the trademark analysis in the Supreme Court’s opinion, this functionality renders the spring
configuration ineligible for trademark status, even if that configuration has gained secondary meaning.238 But is the distinctive spring configuration truly functional in all contexts? Imagine the springs removed from the traffic sign and displayed
on the cab of the company’s service trucks; or imagine them depicted as a hologram in the company logo. The springs in such
contexts continue to serve a communicative function, indicating
to consumers the source of goods or services, but they no longer
perform the mechanical function of flexibly supporting traffic
signs. Outside the context of traffic sign support, there seems
no reason that the springs could not serve purely as trademarks.
This analysis suggests that “functionality” must be context-dependent, rather than immutable. Context dependence
applies not only to prehendable product designs, such as the
shape of traffic sign springs. Symbolic indicia, such as words,
may be functional in the context of data processing or indexing
systems, but communicative in the context of letterhead, billboards, product labels, or television advertisements. The fact
that the alphabetic string “Coca-Cola” in a metatag or Google
search field is functioning as an indexing and search code does
not preclude it from serving as an indicator of source on a soft
drink can, and vice versa. Taking such context into account
would require a slight reorientation of functionality jurisprudence, but the change is both sensible and coherent with current law.
C. TRADEMARK USE
This leads to a third consideration involving the question of
“trademark use,” which has become a flashpoint for discussion

237. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
238. TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 33.
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of cybermarks.239 Courts have held under a variety of factual
settings that a mark which is not being used as a trademark is
not entitled to protection as a trademark.240 In some cases this
has been the theory for disposing of the Internet keyword cases
I consider here.241 Thus, some of the cases mentioned above, regarding pop-up advertisements or keyword searching, have
held that cybermarks that are being used to trigger pop-up advertisements, or that are being used as search terms, are not
being used as trademarks, and so receive no trademark protection.
Certainly the problem that I have identified under the rubric of functionality is closely related to the problem of trademark use. Courts appear to be skirting the edges of the functionality approach in holding in some cases that uses of a
trademark that are “internal” to Internet operations escape liability for infringement.242 The cases holding that no “trademark
use” occurs when a trademark is employed as part of an index
or data set that is “internal” to a software application imply
that if the term is unobserved by consumers, it cannot be serving as a trademark.243 This rationale is correct, so far as it goes.
These cases recognize that a symbol may operate as a trademark in some instances, and yet operate as a symbol of something other than product source in other instances.244 If the
mark in question is employed as a symbol for something other
than source identification, then the requirements of use as a
trademark are not met and there can be no claim under trademark law.245
239. See Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the Demise of
“Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 371 (2006); Lastowka, supra
note 91, at 1394.
240. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 880 (9th
Cir. 1999).
241. See, e.g., S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Austl. Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188,
201–02 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
242. See, e.g., id. at 199; Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d
393, 400–01 (N.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated, 562 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2009); Merck
& Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 2006); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723,
728 (E.D. Va. 2003).
243. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734,
762 (E.D. Mich. 2003); U-Haul Int’l, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728.
244. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co., 293 F. Supp. 2d at 762.
245. See, e.g., Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 878 (6th Cir. 2002); Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 957–58 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
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One might go a step further, taking my argument into account, and say that trademarks that are functioning as code are
not being used as trademarks, and so the trademark use doctrine could address the cybermark problem. But by focusing on
“use” rather than on functionality, a rather muddled jurisprudence on trademark use has emerged.246 This approach has also
been the focus of considerable recent commentary, with some
analysts arguing that the doctrine is illegitimate because it was
not clearly historically articulated,247 and others arguing that
the doctrine is merely a crystallization of principles long extant
in trademark jurisprudence.248
I confess that I find the functionality approach preferable,
in part because it foregrounds the commonalities with copyright and patent that I have identified, and in larger part because it sidesteps the discussion about trademark use. Setting
aside the murkiness of the emerging trademark use doctrine
itself, and the merits of its pedigree, it should be clear that in
many cases cybermarks have dual communicative and functional roles. But functionality doctrine is indifferent as to
whether a product configuration, whether two-dimensional or
three-dimensional, is being “used” as a trademark.249 It may
well be that the shape of the breakfast cereal,250 or of the traffic
sign,251 or of the optical scanning code252 is being used as an indicator of source. But those configurations are also functional,
and so their use as an indicator of source is beside the point;
they cannot be protected as trademarks.
CONCLUSION
I conclude by addressing a final, instrumental objection to
my analysis: that treating cybermarks as the functional strings
of code that they are would leave trademark holders vulnerable
to the depredations of rogue search providers. The rogue search
provider that intentionally designs its search algorithms or ad246. See McGeveran, supra note 101, at 49; Mark P. McKenna, Trademark
Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 773.
247. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1600–06 (2007).
248. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 99, at 1686–87.
249. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 31–32
(2001).
250. Kellog Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 117 (1938).
251. TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 25.
252. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 909, 910 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
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vertising services to deliver results that deceive consumers has
apparently haunted the fears of certain commentators.253 Certainly it was a concern of the Second Circuit panel that decided
the Rescuecom case, and that court’s rejection of the trademark
use doctrine appeared to hinge on such fears.254
This does not seem to me a plausible concern, nor, for that
matter, a relevant one. The worry that search providers will
engage in such behavior assumes myriad fanciful facts not in
evidence. Stacey Dogan seems close to the mark in observing
that this concern is likely a thinly veiled form of hysteria regarding the dominance of Google as a search provider.255 But
that is a problem, if it is a problem at all, for antitrust law, not
trademark law. Some concern over Google’s current primacy in
the technology of search is perhaps understandable, but it
hardly seems a reason to embrace a regime that gives trademark holders a veto in the development of technologies implementing the logic of search. Eric Goldman has plausibly argued
that a search service that delivers results about “Coca-Cola”
when consumers are seeking Adidas, or vice versa, is not long
for this world.256 To the extent that Goldman is wrong, and
market failures might allow the rogue search provider to survive, or even thrive, a variety of regulatory and legal correctives are available outside of trademark law.257 It seems less
likely that the public interest in the development of cybermarks
can be aligned with the business interests of a given trademark
holder than that it can be aligned with the business interest of
search providers.

253. See Grimmelmann, supra note 23, at 61–62; Lastowka, supra note 91,
at 1396–97.
254. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130–31 (2d Cir. 2009).
255. Stacey L. Dogan, Beyond Trademark Use, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 135, 137 (2010).
256. See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 198–99 (2006).
257. See, e.g., Alex W. Cannon, Regulating Adwords: Consumer Protection
in a Market Where the Commodity Is Speech, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 291,
331–32 (2009) (advocating FTC oversight of misleading search engine practices); Andrew Sinclair, Note, Regulation of Paid Listings in Internet Search Engines: A Proposal for FTC Action, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 353, 378 (2004)
(same); see also Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?
Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
1149, 1206–09 (2008). While I think the FTC is well-suited to protect consumers from intentional advertising deception, I confess that I am skeptical of
both the utility and the practicality of the Bracha/Pasquale proposal to engage
some type of index police to vet the algorithms of search providers.

